CASE COMMENTARIES
ANTITRUST
Pricing a product above cost provides no safety net for manufacturers who
engage in exclusionary conduct in violation of the Sherman Act. LePage’s Inc.
v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003).
By Kerry L. Masters
Applying the Sherman Act, the Third Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals held that bundled rebates and exclusive dealing contracts constituted
exclusionary conducted anticompetitive monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, even when the product is priced above cost.
The defendant in LePage’s Inc., Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Company (“3M”), dominated the Scotch tape manufacturing market until the early
1990’s. The plaintiff, LePage’s, began selling second brand and private label
transparent tape in 1980, and, by 1992, held 88% of the United States private label
tape sales market. Subsequently, major retailers such as Wal-Mart, Kmart, Staples,
and Office Depot began selling primarily private label tape with their brand names
rather than the manufacturer’s name. Demand among retailers slowly shifted from
manufacturer branded tape to private label tape.
To meet market demands, 3M entered the private label business in the early
1990’s and began offering bundled rebate programs to certain customers conditioned
on their purchasing from six of 3M’s product lines. Further, 3M encouraged
exclusive contracts with retailers by conditioning discounts on exclusivity, and
encouraged large retailers to cancel or refrain from renewing already existing
contracts with rival tape manufacturers, including LePage’s. LePage’s brought an
antitrust action against 3M claiming that, in response to the increased demand for
private label tape, 3M engaged in several anticompetitive acts. LePage’s claimed that
3M maintained a monopoly by stifling the growth of the private label tape industry
by unfairly marketing to large distributors, thus keeping retail prices for their own
Scotch brand high.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, holding that 3M’s
exclusionary conduct violated the monopolization and anti-competitive provisions of
the Sherman Act, even though the product was never priced below its cost.
177
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that a person cannot monopolize or
attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce. In interpreting this Section,
the Court of Appeals looked to U.S. v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), which stated
that the two elements of a monopolization claim under the Sherman Act are (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. The
Court found that 3M possessed a monopoly power in the transparent tape market
that it used to an anti-competitive effect. The Court noted that 3M’s actions might
be justifiable if its questionable conduct was for a “valid business reasons,” such as
the improvement of consumer welfare, and not to maintain a monopoly or
discourage others from entering the market. The Court determined that 3M acted in
furtherance of its economic interests and did not elicit a valid business reason as a
defense to the monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Where a product manufacturer possesses monopoly power in an industry,
that manufacturer should refrain from anticompetitive conduct, even if the product
is priced above cost. Unless the manufacturer has a valid business reason as
justification, anticompetitive conduct is strictly prohibited.
_____
Real estate service agreement’s price-fixing policy violated the Sherman Act
through its detrimental effect on the ultimate consumer. Freeman v. San Diego
Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
By Michael J. Stanuszek
A real estate listing service’s price-fixing policy violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act because its fee was set at a supracompetitive level and its costs were
attributed to the ultimate consumer, the real estate agents.
Eleven real estate associations in San Diego County combined their separate
real estate databases to form a single database that listed all available properties for
sale in the area. To this end, the associations created a corporation, Sandicor, to
maintain the single database and issue service agreements to the real estate
associations wishing to utilize Sandicore’s listing services. Because real estate agents
in San Diego County were required to belong to an Association of Realtors, the
eleven associations thought it was important that the individual associations that
subscribed to Sandicore continue to provide their real estate agents or subscribers
with their own support services. These support services included things like billing
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and collecting payments, and ensuring that advertisements complied with certain
regulatory guidelines.
To encourage associations to participate in the database, Sandicor paid each
association $25 per subscriber each month for the support services that the
association provided to subscribers of the database. Because of their size, larger
associations could provide support services to their subscribers at a cost below $25
per member, whereas smaller associations, who could not provide support services
for $25 per member, were operating at a loss. The plaintiffs, three San Diego real
estate agents, argued that the larger associations necessarily made a profit from the
service fees because their operating costs for the support services were less than $25.
Thus, plaintiffs alleged that they paid an inflated fee for access to Sandicor’s database
because the support price was fixed at a “supracompetitive level” in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act because they admitted to fixing the support services fees. The Court found that
Sandicor had priced its fees close to the actual cost of running the system.
Therefore, the inflated fees that Sandicor paid to the larger associations for support
services were passed onto consumers like the plaintiffs.
Although Defendants argued that they were immune from the Sherman Act
because they were a single entity and therefore could not have conspired with one
another, the Court found that the associations, in reality, do not act as a single entity.
The associations are owned by their respective members and do not share profits
with one another. They have different ownership, goals, and market strategies.
Furthermore, the associations are actual competitors bidding to sign subscribers to
Sandicor’s database.
Freeman demonstrates that when a corporation enters into a price-fixing
agreement that acts to the detriment of the ultimate consumer, it is not an
appropriate defense to claim that its intent was to aid competition. Thus, if a service
agreement benefits both consumers and joint venturers, the court will often find it
legal under the Sherman Act. However, if the same service agreement has fixed
support fees that act to the detriment of the ultimate consumer, the court will likely
find it illegal.
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BANKRUPTCY
Bankruptcy courts are not authorized to allow Chapter 11 debtors to make
pre-plan payments for prepetition unsecured claims, including payments to
“critical vendors.” Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 291 B.R. 818 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
By Mike Baisley
Reversing the bankruptcy court presiding over the largest retail Chapter 11
case in history, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that bankruptcy courts are not authorized under the Bankruptcy Code or the
equitable “doctrine of necessity” to allow debtors to make pre-plan payments for
prepetition unsecured claims, including payments to “critical vendors” and “foreign
vendors.”
In Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., Kmart filed a petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Kmart sought permission to make
pre-plan payments owed to certain “critical vendors” and “foreign vendors.” Kmart
argued that these payments were necessary to continue doing business with those
suppliers essential to Kmart’s continued operation and successful reorganization.
Capital Factors, which held unsecured claims against Kmart for
approximately $20 million, objected to Kmart’s motions on the basis that the
bankruptcy court was not authorized to allow pre-plan payments for prepetition
claims. Kmart argued to the contrary, invoking both the “doctrine of necessity,” the
notion that bankruptcy courts can issue orders that are otherwise not provided for
when “necessary” to the reorganization, and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the Bankruptcy
Code’s “all writs” provision – to support its position. The bankruptcy court granted
Kmart’s motions and allowed Kmart to pay certain liquor vendors and issuers of
prepetition letters of credit. On appeal, the District Court reversed.
Where certain suppliers are designated as “critical vendors” because their
continued service is necessary for the debtor’s successful reorganization, bankruptcy
courts often allow the debtor to make payments on the prepetition claims of such
vendors. The courts rely upon section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and the
equitable “doctrine of necessity” as grounds for their authority to make such
allowances. Section 105(a) provides that a bankruptcy court “may issue any order,
process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
[Title 11].” Until recently, the courts have generally held that section 105(a)
authorizes a bankruptcy court to exercise its equitable powers by invoking the
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“doctrine of necessity,” thus allowing debtors to pay the prepetition claims of its
critical vendors, if such payments are necessary to keep the debtor in operation.
On the other hand, some courts have recently held that section 105(a) does
not empower the bankruptcy courts to alter the payment priority established in the
Bankruptcy Code. By allowing pre-plan payments of prepetition claims, a
bankruptcy court essentially elevates the claims of select unsecured creditors above
those of even secured creditors. Prior to the decision in Capital Factors, the Seventh
Circuit held that section 105(a) allowed bankruptcy courts to use their equitable
powers “only as necessary to enforce the provisions of the [Bankruptcy] Code, not
to add on to the Code as they see fit.” Based on this rational, the district court in
Capital Factors rejected Kmart’s argument that section 105(a) empowered the
bankruptcy court below to grant Kmart’s critical vendors motions. Accordingly, in
K-Mart, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that neither the
Bankruptcy Code nor Congress allowed pre-plan payment of prepetition claims.
The district court’s decision is likely to have far-reaching consequences in the
way both debtors and vendors approach Chapter 11 bankruptcy and to, perhaps,
reduce the appeal of Illinois as a Chapter 11 venue. First, parties to a bankruptcy in
the Seventh Circuit and certainly in the Northern District of Illinois will no longer
have the option of pursuing pre-plan payments for prepetition claims. This decision
forces bankruptcy debtors in the Seventh Circuit (and potentially other circuits) to
appease their vendors without a motion to designate them as “critical vendors.” In
turn, vendors will be forced to decide the value of the debtor’s business relationship,
and what additional consideration the vendor will require to offset the new risk of
non-payment. Secondly, the market may assume a more significant role in
determining how many entities successfully reorganize and survive Chapter 11
bankruptcy. Because it is likely that some vendors will continue to demand critical
vendor treatment and others may cease to supply the same quality or quantity of
goods and services, the balance of supply and demand may drive market prices up
and increase the overall costs of doing business. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will
likely have to decide whether bankruptcy courts are authorized to allow pre-plan
payments of prepetition claims under section 105(a) and the “doctrine of necessity.”
_____
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Remedies under the Securities Investor Protection Act are available only to an
insolvent broker’s “customers.” In re First Interregional Equity Corp., 290 B.R. 265
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2003).
By Edward W. Collins
Analyzing the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”), the
federal bankruptcy court determined that loans defaulted on by brokerage houses do
not qualify as “customer claims” under the act. Thus, SIPA affords no protection to
these types of creditors.
Congress enacted SIPA in order to calm investors’ nerves in the wake of
several brokerage house insolvencies during the 1960s. SIPA operates in much the
same way as FDIC insurance – in cases where the liquidation of an insolvent
brokerage house does not cover the amount due to its customers, the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) insures investor claims for up to $500,000
($100,000 of which may be cash). The protection afforded by SIPA, however, is
only available to “customers” as defined by the act; creditors of insolvent brokers
must recover their debts out of the general estate of the debtor. Thus, SIPA bestows
preferential standing upon “customers.”
Liquidation of the First Interregional Equity Corporation (“FIEC”)
commenced in 1997 after FIEC had allegedly engaged in a fraudulent “Ponzi”
scheme.1 The courts appointed a trustee to discharge FIEC’s customer obligations
pursuant to SIPA. Central to the case at hand were securities that Ms. Bonnie
Josephs allowed FIEC to hold in exchange for interest payments above the
securities’ coupon rates. The trustee found that these “loans” did not qualify as
“customer claims” as defined by SIPA and filed a Motion to Affirm the Trustee’s
Claim Determination.
In order to qualify as a “customer” under SIPA, the following three
conditions must be satisfied: (1) a claimant must have a claim for securities or cash
held by the broker in the ordinary course of its business; (2) the securities or cash
must have been held from, or for, the claimant’s securities account; and (3) the
securities or cash must have been held by the broker for the purpose of investing in
the securities market or for safekeeping. The fact that a claimant may qualify as a
1 “Ponzi scheme” is defined as an “[i]nvestment swindle in which money from new investors is used
to pay off earlier ones. Such schemes require an ever-expanding group of participants and collapse
when new players cannot be found.” GARY SMITH, FINANCIAL ASSETS, MARKETS, AND
INSTITUTIONS app. 1, at 47 (1993).
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“customer” in regard to some fiduciary relations with the broker does not
automatically qualify the claimant as a “customer” with respect to all dealings with
the broker. Additionally, all claims must be made within six months of the
notification of the liquidation proceedings. 2
In addition to some financial dealings that did qualify under SIPA, Ms.
Josephs loaned several securities to FIEC in exchange for interest payments of four
percent (4%) above the respective coupon rates. Ms. Josephs claimed that she did
not “loan” the securities (despite referring to the transactions as “loans” in earlier
correspondence with FIEC), but rather gave them to FIEC for the sake of
safekeeping. Ms. Josephs’ argument failed to persuade the court.
The court
doubted that a business entity would pay interest in excess of the coupon rate if its
only purpose was to safeguard the securities.
Furthermore, the court stated that these securities held by FIEC were not
connected in any way to Ms. Josephs’ participation in the securities market since they
were not listed on any account maintained for Ms. Josephs. The court found that
the relationship between Ms. Josephs
and FIEC in regard to these particular securities was one of creditor-debtor, not
customer-broker. Ms. Josephs had invested in FIEC; the four per cent (4%)
premium represented the risk Ms. Josephs assumed in allowing FIEC to maintain the
securities for its own financial leverage use. Therefore, since the securities were
neither listed on any account maintained for Ms. Josephs nor held for the purpose of
investing in the securities market or for safekeeping, the court granted the trustee’s
motion.
This case emphasizes that SIPA does not provide protection to all victims of
brokerage insolvencies; the protection extends only to “customers” as defined by the
act. As a result, creditors should not be lulled into a false sense of security that the
debts owed by such entities are insured under SIPA. Such creditors will be relegated
to recovering their losses, if at all, out of the broker’s general estate, which, if SIPA
protection is required for “customers,” will most likely provide little recovery.
_____

The bankruptcy court held Ms. Josephs’ late filed “customer claim[s]” time barred and did not allow
her to amend her original claim to include them.
2
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Reasonableness of indemnification agreements between Chapter 11 debtors
and their financial advisors will be assessed using the principles of the
business judgment rule. In re Baltimore Emergency Servs. II, LLC, 291 B.R. 382
(Bankr. D. Md. Mar. 6, 2003).
By James B. Johnson
Following the lead of the Third Circuit, the Bankruptcy Court of Maryland
held that the indemnification of a financial advisor to a Chapter 11 debtor is not a
per se unreasonable term of employment under 11 U.S.C. § 328(a). The court further
held that the reasonableness of an indemnification agreement between Chapter 11
debtors and their financial advisors will be assessed using the principles of the
business judgment rule.
ECS Holdings, Inc. (ECS) retained Evercore as its financial advisor in its
Chapter 11 case. The application filled out by ECS contained an indemnification
provision in which ECS agreed to hold Evercore harmless from and against any
losses, claims, damages, expenses, and liabilities. However, Evercore would be liable
for those losses, claims, damages, expenses, and liabilities that a court of competent
jurisdiction determined to have resulted from its own bad faith, gross negligence, or
willful misconduct.
The issue before the court was whether the indemnification agreement of the
parties was reasonable. In In re United Artists Theater Co., 315 F.3d 217 (3d. Cir.
2003), the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to address the issue. In United
Artists, the court affirmed a Chapter 11 debtor’s retention of its financial advisor
under terms that indemnified the financial advisor from its own negligence, but the
court applied business judgment principles to place limits on the reasonableness of
such indemnification provisions.
These principles provided several safeguards. First, the financial advisor
would be liable for a breach of its duty of loyalty. Second, the advisor would be
liable for a breach of the duty of care in the process by which it rendered its advice
to the debtor. Third, an indemnification agreement would not cover contract
disputes with the debtor, including disputes over the services that the financial
advisor has agreed to render. Finally, “limiting words” (words that would expand the
debtor’s indemnification obligations) would be outside the bounds of acceptable
public policy.
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The Baltimore Emergency Services court realized that financial advice free from
artificial constraints would be beneficial to debtors. In an attempt to advance that
notion, the court followed the lead of United Artists and applied business judgment
principles to the case. In doing so, the court held that (1) claims for simple
negligence may be indemnified, but indemnifying claims for gross negligence would
be outside the bounds of acceptable public policy, (2) agreements that eliminate the
exclusion for bad faith would result in an unacceptable expansion of the debtor’s
indemnification obligation, (3) contractual disputes need to be expressly excluded
from the scope of the indemnification agreement, and (4) the duties of loyalty and
care are not dischargeable and should be expressly excluded from the scope of an
indemnification agreement.
This decision illustrates the importance of financial advising services to
Chapter 11 Debtors. Applying business judgment principles to assess the
reasonableness of an indemnification agreement between a Chapter 11 debtor and a
financial advisor clarifies the responsibilities of such a relationship.
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
Non-lawyer minority shareholder prohibited from representing corporation
pro se. Pelts v. Int’l Med. Servs Corp., No. W2002-00388-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 620, 2003 WL 22071462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
By Nicholas J. Chase
Tennessee recognizes a corporation as an “artificial entity,” separate from its
shareholders and officers. Consequently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 73 prohibits a non-lawyer minority shareholder from
representing his or her corporation pro se.
In 1994, Hugh A. Hines, Jr. (“Hines”), Bernard Tibbets (“Tibbets”), and
Carlton Smith, Jr. (“Smith”), formed International Medical Services Corporation
(“IMS”). Hines, the majority shareholder with sixty percent of the shares, became
the Chairman of the Board. Tibbets and Smith each held twenty percent of the
“No person shall engage in the ‘practice of law’ or the ‘law business’ in Tennessee, except pursuant
to the authority of this Court, as evidenced by a license issued in accordance with this Rule, or in
accordance with the provisions of the Rule governing special or limited practice.” TENN. SUP. CT. R.
7.
3
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shares and assumed the positions of President and Secretary/Treasurer, respectively.
The primary assets of IMS, and the cause of disagreement in the subsequent
litigation, were contiguous parcels of land measuring 1.04 and 13.92 acres. In 1996,
Hines notified both Tibbets and Smith of a special IMS shareholder meeting, which
neither Tibbets nor Smith attended. During that meeting in which Hines’s attorney
assumed the role of acting Secretary, the “board” elected Hines President and
Hines’s wife Secretary. This “new board” (comprised of Hines as both Chairman
and President and Hines’s wife as Secretary) authorized Hines to sell the 13.92 acre
tract. Hines waited approximately one month before notifying Tibbets and Smith of
these events.
In 1999, Smith and a partner formed the Remote Internet Corporation
(“RIC”) and purchased the mortgage on IMS’s 13.92 acre parcel. When Hines
missed a payment, RIC sent a foreclosure notice to IMS. In 2000, Hines contracted
to sell both parcels of land to Robert Pelts (“Pelts”). As proof of his authority to sell
the land, Hines presented Pelts the minutes from the 1996 IMS “board” meeting in
which the “new board” authorized Hines to sell the land. Three weeks later, Smith
and Tibbets notified Pelts that Hines did not have the authority to sell the land.
Pelts then sued IMS for specific performance and filed a motion for summary
judgment. Smith, on behalf of both IMS and RIC, and Tibbets launched a litany of
counter and cross motions. The trial court granted Pelts’ motion for summary
judgment under the theory that Hines acted with the apparent authority of IMS
when he contracted to sell the land to Pelts. Smith filed a notice of appeal, pro se, and
on behalf of both Tibbets and IMS.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals immediately recognized that Smith was not
a licensed attorney and, therefore, could represent neither Tibbets nor IMS. As a
result, the court promptly dismissed the issues involving those parties as not being
properly before the court. However, the court did comment on the issue of whether
Hines could sell the property to Pelts. The court endorsed the trial court’s granting
of summary judgment for Pelts. The court reasoned that because Tibbets and Smith
had never taken appropriate action to remove Hines as President of IMS, as far as
Pelts was concerned, Hines possessed the apparent authority to sell the land.
Despite the fact that many of the issues were disposed of due to the fact that
Smith was not a licensed attorney, the decision reinforces the importance of
awareness and prompt action in the corporate setting. Tibbets and Smith were aware
of Hines’s questionable actions as President of IMS and of his intent to sell the IMS
property. Yet, Tibbets and Smith took no action for several years and did not deal
with Hines in a timely manner and in accordance with IMS’s bylaws. Their inaction
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exposed their individual interests and the interests of an innocent third party.
Though the outcome of this case appears to hinge on the standing of the parties
before the court, the Tennessee Court of Appeals offers insight into its
interpretation of apparent authority in a corporate setting.
_____
Where the criteria of a constructive trust are satisfied, courts may impress
such a trust to protect any kind of legal entity. LaFollette Med. Ctr. v. City of
LaFollette, 115 S.W.3d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
By Ryan Russell
A constructive trust may be used to protect any kind of legal entity against
those “who, . . . by any form of unconscionable conduct . . . obtain[ ] or hold[ ] the
legal right to property which [they] ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold
and enjoy.” Thus, a constructive trust can be used as a vehicle in preventing another
individual or entity from diverting a legal entity’s property from its original intended
use.
LaFollette Medical Center was established in 1957 to provide medical care to
the local indigent community. The City of Lafollette funded the medical center’s
construction through bonds, but the debt was repaid entirely by the Medical Center.
Therefore, the City did not contribute any funds to the Medical Center’s
construction. The Medical Center operated as a not-for-profit entity throughout its
existence, and because of its corporate structure, never had to pay property taxes to
the City government and was able to achieve its goal of providing medical care to
anyone in need.
The LaFollette City Council, without the consent of the Medical Center’s
Board of Trustees, decided in 1999 to sell the Medical Center to St. Mary’s Health
Systems, a for-profit corporation. The Medical Center and its Board of Trustees
then filed suit against the City of LaFollette in an attempt to stop the sale. The trial
court held that the City had the authority to sell the Medical Center, but ordered all
proceeds from the sale to be placed in a constructive trust for the purpose of
providing healthcare to the community. The City of LaFollette appealed to the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in an attempt to keep the sale proceeds out of the
constructive trust.
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In Tennessee, “a constructive trust arises . . . against one who, by fraud, . . .
duress[,] . . . abuse of confidence, [a] commission of wrong, or by any form of
unconscionable conduct . . . has obtained or holds the legal right to property which
he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.” The Court of
Appeals then held that “if the [above] criteria [are] met . . . a constructive trust might
be impressed for the benefit of . . . any . . . legal entity.”
The court noted that no City funds were used in the Medical Center’s
construction and at no time in the Medical Center’s history did it receive funds from
the City. The court summarized the situation by stating that “the City is attempting
to reap where it has not sown.” Given these facts, the court concluded that it would
be unconscionable to allow the City to use the proceeds of the sale for “any general
purpose [that] [it] might choose.” The court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
place the proceeds in a constructive trust “to be used for one of the original
purposes for which the Hospital was built – to render indigent health care.”
The LaFollette court illustrated that if a party uses means that a court might
consider unconscionable to obtain control over the assets of any legal entity, that
party faces the real possibility that a constructive trust might be used to regain
control over those assets. The court also made it clear that it was willing to impress
a constructive trust for those regained assets for the benefit of any type of legal entity
and for the original purposes to which that entity served.
CONTRACTS
Where contract negotiations take place in multiple states, the law of the state
in which the contract binds the parties governs subsequent contract disputes.
A.I.J.J. Enters., Inc. v. Weizer, No. W2002-00975-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 142, 2003 WL 1855102 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2003).
By Joshua Flowers
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that Tennessee’s lex loci rule required
that where contract negotiations, formation, and performance took place in different
states, the law of the state where the contract bound the parties governed the
contract dispute.
AIJJ Enterprises contacted Norman Weizer regarding employment based in
California with responsibilities in surrounding states. Weizer interviewed with AIJJ
executives in New York and accepted an employment offer. Weizer began his
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employment by attending a training session in Florida, where AIJJ asked him to sign
a recruitment fee contract. The agreement obligated Weizer to pay recruitment costs
incurred by AIJJ if he left his employment for any reason within two years. Weizer
modified the contract by crossing out a parenthetical phrase that described “leaving”
as “including but not limited to your termination of me.” Weizer signed the
amended contract and faxed it to New York, where an AIJJ executive signed it.
After working for ten months, Weizer submitted his resignation. AIJJ then filed suit
to recover $12,000 for Weizer’s recruitment costs pursuant to the contract under
Florida law.
Applying the lex loci rule, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the
recruitment provision in Weizer’s contract unenforceable under New York law
because AIJJ terminated Weizer. In Tennessee, the general lex loci rule states that
“the substantive law of the state in which the contract was made is applied to
disputes arising from the contract.” The general rule does not apply if the parties
agreed in good faith that the contract would be performed in another state and
envisioned that the other state’s law would govern the contract. To determine if the
exception to the lex loci rule applies, courts look to the terms of the contract itself
and the surrounding circumstances to determine the parties’ intent.
Initially, the court considered two possible choices of law. First, Weizer
argued that California law applied because AIJJ based Weizer in California during his
employment. The court found that California law did not apply under the exception
to the lex loci rule because the parties did not envision Weizer working only in
California when they formed the contract. Secondly, the trial court applied Florida
law because Weizer signed the contract while physically located in Florida. The
Court of Appeals rejected both alternatives and concluded that New York law
applied because Weizer’s amended contract constituted a counter-offer that became
binding when AIJJ accepted it in New York.
Applying the New York rule that construes contracts according to the
parties’ intent, the court found the contract ambiguous because the contract’s
crossed-out parenthetical phrase defined the word “leave.” Thus, Weizer’s
amendment eliminated his obligation to pay damages upon his termination. The
court held that the contract reflected the parties’ intent that Weizer would be
obligated to repay the recruitment fees if he left for any reason other than
termination. Because the court did not find by a preponderance of the evidence that
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Weizer resigned, it held that AIJJ failed to meet the burden of establishing all the
elements of its case.
The decision emphasizes the need for careful planning during contract
negotiations. In light of Tennessee’s lex loci rule, transactional attorneys should be
aware of the implications of sending offers and counter-offers to parties in other
states. The lex loci rule emphasizes the importance of the final negotiation phase by
requiring the application of the law of the state in which the contract becomes
binding to any subsequent disputes.
_____
Incorporated documents can be applicable to both signatories and
non-signatories of a bank’s signature card. Jureczki v. Banc One Texas, N.A., 252
F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
By Derrick A. Free
Applying both Federal and Texas state law, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas held that, although a depositor may or may not
actually receive other unsigned documents that are incorporated by reference into a
bank’s signature card that the depositor signs, provisions included in those
incorporated unsigned documents may be enforced not only as between the bank
and the depositor, but also against other similarly situated non-signatory third parties.
In late 1998, the plaintiffs executed a signature card that incorporated by
reference the bank’s rules and regulations and authorized Banc One to conduct
certain transactions on their behalf. In 2000, allegedly without the knowledge or
permission of the plaintiffs, approximately $800,000 was withdrawn from the
plaintiffs’ account with Banc One and used to purchase a variable annuity. The
plaintiffs alleged that they ultimately lost approximately $400,000 in the transaction
and assessed a penalty when they attempted to mitigate their damages. In this action,
the plaintiffs sued Banc One Texas, N.A., Banc One Securities Corp., Banc One
Insurance Agency, Inc., and Bill Berry, a bank employee, individually.
The bank’s rules and regulations contained a provision mandating arbitration
for any claim arising from any Banc One deposit account. Banc One asserted that all
the claims in the present action arose from the alleged unauthorized movement of
funds from the plaintiffs’ deposit account and moved the court to compel
arbitration. The plaintiffs claimed that they never agreed to arbitrate claims arising
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from their deposit account with Banc One and that three of the defendants were
never parties to the signature card governing the deposit account.
The district court held the arbitration agreement within the bank’s rules and
regulations was enforceable, dismissed the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice, and
ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration. Using “liberal federal policy [that]
favor[s] arbitration agreements,” as stated in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq., coupled with Texas state law which holds that “an unsigned
paper may be incorporated by reference into a paper signed by the person sought to
be charged,” the district court held that the arbitration agreement was applicable to
the plaintiffs in their action against all of the defendants, regardless of whether they
were signatories to the card arrangement. The district court characterized this
particular arbitration agreement as “broad,” which through the Grigson test applied by
the court, brought the non-parties to the signature card within the scope of the
arbitration agreement. Although the arbitration agreement was heavily slanted in
favor of the bank, the District Court noted there is nothing per se unconscionable
about arbitration agreements. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit previously rejected the
argument that the inability to negotiate terms of an arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable.
As Jureczki illustrates, transactional attorneys representing financial
institutions have a powerful tool to compel arbitration for claims arising from
account disputes. Not only does the Jureczki decision confirm the enforceability of
arbitration agreements between parties, it also supports compelled arbitration for
non-signatories who face claims arising out of the same action that fall within the
Grigson parameters. Individual depositors should be advised about the probable
inevitability of such clauses attaching to their accounts and the rights and
requirements that go along with them.

192

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 5

COPYRIGHT
The 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act is constitutional. Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
By Zachariah N. Stansell
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) did not violate the “limited term” requirement of the
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. In its decision,
the court faced the question of whether the largest expansion on the copyright term
in United States history was Constitutional.
In 1998, Congress passed the CTEA to extend the term of federal copyrights
from fifty to seventy years after the death of the author of the copyrighted work or
95 years from the date of publication for any work published before 1978, making
CTEA the largest expansion of the term of copyright in United States history. In
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the petitioners were businesses and individuals whose services and
products were built on copyrighted works that had gone into the public domain, but
the copyright protections were resurrected for another twenty years by CTEA. The
petitioners sought a determination that the CTEA fails both under the Copyright
Clause and the guarantee of free speech granted by the First Amendment. The
CTEA brought the baseline United States copyright term in line with the European
Union term adopted in 1993. The CTEA’s new terms apply to any work published
after January 1, 1978.
The Supreme Court affirmed both the District Court for the District of
Columbia and the Court of Appeals, holding that the CTEA did not violate the
constitutional requirement of a “limited time” for copyrights and that it did not
violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. A copyright should be the
engine of free expression by supplying an economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas. The extension of copyright terms would not violate free speech
because copyright does not prevent the fair use of an idea and does not grant a
monopoly on any fact or idea; rather, it only protects the specific form of expression
that the author uses.
The Court also affirmed that the Copyright Clause allows Congress to
amplify the terms of an existing copyright and noted that the Court has historically
deferred to Congress’ judgment regarding copyright protection. Copyright is a quid
pro quo arrangement in that the author benefits by retaining control over his or her
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work in exchange for advancing the store of knowledge, while society benefits from
the author’s ideas in exchange for that idea becoming part of the public domain after
a limited time. The Court reasoned that authors of work would reasonably
understand that the protection under the Copyright Act is not only for the place in
time when it is gained, but for any renewal or extension legislated during that time.
The Court found no basis for the petitioners’ proposition that a copyright term is
not for a “limited time” if it may be extended for another “limited time.” The Court
disagreed with the unconstitutional argument too, especially since Congress had
already expanded copyright terms in 1831, 1909, and 1978.
Transactional lawyers should advise their clients that the CTEA will
reactivate copyrights that had entered into the public domain since 1978. Though
future copyrights will not be greatly affected, royalties will now be due for works that
have been in the public domain for over two decades. While giving a measure of
long-term security to the authors of works, the Act may create a strain on businesses
and researchers who will now have to pay royalties for materials previously in the
public domain.
CORPORATE
In no situation are target corporations allowed to use defensive devices in
such a manner as to create an absolute lockup for a merger. Omnicare, Inc.
v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003)
By Matthew J. Ledwith
Applying Delaware corporate law, a 3-2 divided Delaware Supreme Court
held that although the use of defensive devices is allowed, the directors of a target
corporation are not allowed to execute a merger agreement that combines these
devices to create an absolute lockup. Instead, the directors are required to uphold
their fiduciary duties by contracting for the inclusion of a “fiduciary out” clause, even
though doing so may cause the merger to fail. A “fiduciary-out” clause in a merger
agreement permits the board to terminate the signed agreement if it decides that
termination is necessary to uphold the directors' fiduciary obligations.
NCS, the Delaware target corporation in this case, was a leading independent
provider of pharmacy services to long-term health care institutions prior to the
market decline in the heath care industry in late 1999. As the market began to
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decline, NCS became a financially troubled publicly traded company. Because of its
financial troubles, NCS searched for companies that might be interested in a merger
for over two years.
Omnicare (“Omni”), a rival in the pharmaceutical business, offered to
purchase the assets of NCS out of bankruptcy, but declined any interest in the
possibility of a merger. NCS rejected this initial offer because it most likely would
not have provided any recovery for the NCS stockholders. NCS had no more
contact with Omni between November 2001 and January 2002. Another rival,
Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., expressed interest in a merger but was wary of
entering into negotiations because it had previously lost a bidding war to Omni.
Genesis demanded that if NCS was interested in merging with it, its deal must
include the following three defensive devices: first, that NCS must present the deal
to the stockholders regardless of whether the board later withdraws its
recommendation; second, that NCS must omit any “fiduciary out” clause; and finally,
that NCS must approve the voting agreement between Genesis and the two majority
stockholders that were required to vote their shares in favor of the Genesis merger.
These devices, working together, locked up the Genesis merger with NCS regardless
of any superior offers that could come along later.
Omni then reentered negotiations with NCS on a conditional basis that
caused Genesis to increase its offer contingent on its agreement with NCS being
signed within twenty-four hours. The board of NCS met with its legal and financial
counsel and, after weighing the loss of the Genesis deal against the conditional Omni
deal, decided to approve both the voting agreement and the merger with Genesis.
Hours after the Genesis and NCS deal was signed, Omni faxed a draft merger
agreement which was still conditioned on a due diligence review. Two months later,
Omni dropped the due diligence condition and irrevocably committed itself to a deal
superior to Genesis’. However, the defensive devices employed by Genesis locked
up its deal with NCS and prevented NCS’ board from accepting Omni’s deal.
The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that when a board uses defensive
devices, this decision is subject to the Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny.
Therefore, to be allowed, the devices must not be preclusive or coercive and they
must be within the range of reasonable responses. The majority determined that in
this case the defensive devices were both coercive and preclusive and were outside of
this range of reasonableness. The court held that the devices were coercive because
the minority stockholders were not forced to vote for the deal but their votes were
stripped of any effectiveness. The devices were preclusive in that they barred any
future offers from being entertained. The defensive devices were also held to be
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unenforceable because they prevented the board from carrying out its fiduciary
duties. The minority stockholders were in a powerless position because the deal
would be accepted regardless of how they voted and were forced to rely on NCS’
board to protect their interests. The court stated that, in such a circumstance, the
board must not submit to a company’s demand to “lock up” a deal, but rather is
obligated to demand the inclusion of a “fiduciary out” clause. This holds true
regardless of whether the insistence on such a clause will cause one bidder to
withdraw its offer and leave the company with a bid from a company that has
continually expressed its desire for an asset sale and maintains due diligence as a
condition to any merger deal.
This decision effectively removes a target company’s ability to offer
assurances to a bidder that the agreement reached will be approved and that
competing offers will not be considered accepted. Although it appears that the
majority adopted this rule to ensure stockholders receive the highest value, the rule
may actually reduce the value these stockholders receive if no initial bidder can be
found due to the inability to lock up the transaction. As a result of the increased risk
of either losing the deal to a newcomer’s subsequent superior bid, an initial bidder’s
first offer may also be lower to allow for the possibility that bidding may ensue.
PROPERTY
Easements do not automatically revert to the servient property when an
easement holder fails to meet a condition subsequent. Rector v. Halliburton, No.
M1999-02802-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 149, 2003 WL 535924 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2003).
By Eddie L. Broomfield
Often, the destruction of an easement is more complicated than the original
creation of that easement. Current land owners may experience more problems than
benefits with easements that run with the land. However, owners should be cautious
when they attempt to terminate existing easements upon their property; otherwise,
owners may find themselves ensnared in difficulties like those considered by the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in Rector v. Halliburton.
Elizabeth Halliburton purchased a Nashville home in 1953. In 1969, the
state exercised its power of eminent domain over a portion of the property in order
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to further a highway construction project. This acquisition left the remainder of the
property inaccessible.
In 1973, Halliburton purchased an express easement from her neighbor,
Bessie Brown. This easement allowed for a strip of land to provide driveway access
to the Halliburton property. Halliburton acquired an expressly perpetual easement
conditioned upon proper hard surface maintenance of the driveway.
Paul Rector purchased the Brown property in 1988. Over the next several
years, Rector continuously attempted to acquire the Halliburton property. Rector
consistently disturbed Halliburton by keeping her from laying new gravel on the
driveway, trying to convince Nashville Electric Service (“NES”) to cut power to the
Halliburton house, twice attempting to construct a fence across the Halliburton
driveway, and attempting to block access to the Halliburton property by parking a
vehicle across the driveway.
Rector filed suit for trespass in 1998, naming Halliburton and NES as
defendants, as a result of Halliburton’s continued use of the driveway easement and
NES’ repositioning of power lines over Rector’s property. Rector admitted that he
had no valid claim against NES, for the power lines originally stood for more than
twenty years and their uncontested use of the land resulted in a prescriptive
easement. Yet, Rector claimed that Halliburton’s failure to gravel the driveway prior
to 1994 resulted in a reverter and that Halliburton’s continued use of the driveway
since 1994 constituted a trespass. Halliburton filed several counterclaims, including
trespass. The trial court dismissed all of Rector’s claims and sustained Halliburton’s
counterclaims.
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court and further considered three
key issues raised by Rector. The first issue is whether NES abandoned its
prescriptive easement over Rector’s land by moving the power lines. In Tennessee,
an easement owner cannot substantially increase or add to the burden placed upon
the subservient estate. The power lines took up much less of Rector’s land after they
were moved in 1995, resulting in a decrease of the burden upon Rector’s land.
The second issue considered whether Halliburton’s express easement expired
when she failed to maintain a hard surface along the driveway. The agreement
between Brown and Halliburton stated that the driveway should be maintained at the
holder’s expense as “either rock, gravel, or paved.” The court viewed this as a
condition subsequent not resulting in an automatic reverter to Rector. The court
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further determined that the easement continued because Rector did not affirmatively
attempt to establish control of the disputed land prior to 1994.
Finally, the court considered whether Rector had committed a trespass by
interfering with Halliburton’s interest in the driveway. The law clearly states that an
easement holder has a right to the full enjoyment and use of the easement. Thus, the
court found interference in Rector’s attempts to fence off and otherwise block the
driveway.
Rector v. Halliburton illustrates the difficulty of destroying easements upon
property. Transactional attorneys should advise their clients not to interfere with
easements upon their land, but to watch carefully for any abuse of that easement. If
an abuse occurs, the owner of the subservient estate should act with haste in order to
revert the easement. Transactional attorneys should note that easements do not
automatically revert to the servient property when an easement holder fails to meet a
condition subsequent, and that courts will find actionable any interference with the
easement holder’s full enjoyment and use of the easement.
_____
County’s decision to freeze homestead property values on date of acquisition
for purpose of ad valorem tax assessment violates neither the Federal nor the
Georgia Constitutions. Columbus-Muscogee County Consol. Gov’t v. CM Tax
Equalization, Inc., 579 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. Mar. 24, 2003).
By Nathaniel A. Earle
Applying state and federal constitutional law, the Supreme Court of Georgia
upheld the constitutionality of a local constitutional amendment authorizing a county
to freeze the value of homestead property for ad valorem tax purposes at the
property’s fair market value during the year acquired. The Court determined that the
Homestead Freeze did not conflict with the uniformity in taxation clause of
Georgia’s Constitution, did not violate the equal protection clauses of the state and
Federal Constitutions, and did not unreasonably interfere with the right to travel
guaranteed under the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the County’s decision to
utilize an acquisition-value system for assessing homestead property taxes constituted
a legitimate exercise of the government’s policy-making function.
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In 1981, the General Assembly of Georgia approved a local constitutional
amendment permitting Columbus-Muscogee County (the “County”) to assess
homestead property for ad valorem tax purposes at the property’s value on the date of
acquisition, instead of the usual method of reassessing the value of the property
periodically.
The Court found that the Homestead Freeze did not conflict with the state
constitution’s uniformity in taxation clause. The Court noted that the Homestead
Freeze reflected the express intent of the legislature to modify the uniformity clause,
and that the amendment expressed the prevailing sovereign will of the people.
Under equal protection analysis, when a classification does not impact a
fundamental right or operate to the disadvantage of a suspect class, the disparate
treatment caused by the classification must satisfy only the rational relationship test.
A classification will survive rational relationship review if it is based on rational
distinctions and bears a direct relationship to the purpose of the legislation. Using
equal protection analysis, the Court found that the goals of the Homestead Freeze
included neighborhood preservation, continuity and stability, and the protection of
reliance interests of existing homeowners, and that the acquisition-value system bore
a rational relationship to those purposes.
The Court further observed that the Homestead Freeze applied to all
homeowners regardless of income. The state based the Homestead Freeze solely on
the acquisition date, irrespective of a buyer’s income or ability to pay. Moreover, the
Court determined that the Homestead Freeze benefited all homeowners, including
those belonging to minority groups and lower income brackets, for the Homestead
Freeze shielded homeowners from the adverse effects of gentrification in their
neighborhoods.
The Court concluded that the state may legitimately choose to protect the
reliance interests of existing homeowners, even at the expense of new purchasers. In
theory, existing owners have vested expectations in their homes which are relatively
more deserving of protection than the anticipatory expectations of prospective
buyers.
Finally, the Court noted that the Homestead Freeze applied to all persons
seeking to purchase homestead property in the County, both new arrivals and longterm county residents alike. The Freeze, therefore, did not constitute an
impermissible burden on the right to travel.
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Because acquisition-value taxation will not necessarily benefit all purchasers
of homestead property, clients should be advised to consider the probable duration
of their investments. While the long-term investor stands to gain predictable tax
liability and protection against inflation and gentrification in an acquisition-value
system, the best advice for the transient homeowner is caveat emptor, buyer beware.
TAX
In Tennessee, when a taxpayer pays taxes to another state on an item used to
produce tangible personal property, the taxpayer is allowed a credit
equivalent to that amount of taxes previously paid. Bellsouth Adver. and Publ’g Co.
v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. 2003).
By Joseph W. Ballard
In Tennessee, a taxpayer paying taxes to another state on an item used to
produce tangible personal property is allowed a Tennessee tax credit in that same
amount. Moreover, this credit can be used to offset the applicable Tennessee use tax
if the taxpayer distributes the tangible personal property. Regardless of whether the
distributed property actually contains the item used in production, the credit can be
applied. This is the situation the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed in Bellsouth
Advertising and Publishing Co. v. Johnson.
The defendant, the Tennessee Department of Revenue, audited the plaintiff,
a producer and distributor of telephone directories. During the audit, the plaintiff
realized it neglected to claim credit for $165,000 in sales tax previously paid in
another state in connection with a purchase of photocompositions.
Photocompositions are properly formatted pages of a telephone directory that
transfer to printing plates. The printing plates then produce the actual pages of the
telephone directories.
Upon completion of the printing process, the
photocompositions are destroyed.
During the audit, the plaintiff asked the auditor to apply an appropriate
reduction for the tax credit it neglected to claim on the sales tax paid on the
photocompositions. The auditor declined to do so. Following the audit, the auditor
issued an assessment for sales and use tax liability against the plaintiff in the amount
of $125,179.87. If allowed, the proposed credit for the photocompositions would
have more than completely offset the auditor’s tax assessment.
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The plaintiff filed a claim asking for a refund from the Department of
Revenue. The Department denied the plaintiff’s claim, and the plaintiff proceeded
to file a claim in Chancery Court challenging the auditor’s sales and use tax
assessment. This claim was consolidated with the plaintiff’s second claim, which
demanded a refund for the amount of sales tax paid on the photocompositions. The
Special Chancellor granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment on both
claims. The Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, and the
plaintiff timely filed an appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which reversed the
courts below.
In Tennessee, a use tax is levied on the cost price of each item of tangible
personal property distributed rather than sold. However, the use tax will not
duplicate the taxes if the distributor of tangible personal property has previously paid
like taxes in another state. The cost price of tangible personal property includes
materials used, labor or service costs, transportation charges, or any expenses
whatsoever. The plaintiff’s cost price included the cost of the photocompositions,
printing, and other expenses.
The trial court and the Tennessee Court of Appeals found the sales tax the
plaintiff paid on the photocompositions to be dissimilar to the use tax assessed on
the distribution of the directories. As the auditor’s assessment of a delinquent use
tax failed to duplicate a like tax previously paid by the plaintiff, the courts had held
the auditor’s denial of a tax credit was appropriate.
On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that
Tennessee allows items used in producing tangible personal property to be calculated
in the total cost price of the tangible personal property. Therefore, the portion of
the cost price that includes the photocompositions had already been assessed a like
tax in another state.
In determining the merits of this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reviewed the underlying purposes originally intended for the use tax. Initially, the
Court found that the use tax is a compliment – not a supplement or addition – to the
sales tax. The Court noted that the use tax was designed to create parity between
resident and nonresident merchants doing business in Tennessee. The use tax is not
designed to hinder out-of-state merchants; instead, the tax attempts to prevent
foreign merchants from obtaining unfair advantages over local merchants. The
Court found the legislature never intended multiple taxes to apply to the same goods
and services.
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Interpreting the definition of cost price, the Court found that taxes paid on
items used to produce the final product and taxes paid on the final product were
indistinguishable. Accordingly, the sales tax and the use tax complement one
another and should not be simultaneously applied to the same product. The Court,
therefore, reversed the judgment of the lower courts and granted summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.
As Bellsouth indicates, Tennessee provides a tax credit to alleviate a taxpayer
from paying duplicate taxes. Transactional attorneys need to instruct taxpayers to
claim a use tax credit on taxes paid out-of-state for the completed product when the
product is distributed. Additionally, a taxpayer is entitled to a use tax credit on taxes
assessed on items used in the production of the completed product. Taxpayers
should account for any taxes paid in a foreign state from the start of the project until
the distribution of the completed project.
_____
Oral license agreements involving equipment on ocean vessels are subject to
Florida’s state use tax; taxes involving ocean vessels engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce are entitled to a prorated tax rate. Dream Boat, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, No. 1D02-1253, 2003 WL 1560175, 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 4097 (Fla. Ct.
App. Mar. 27, 2003)
By Anna Burck
The Florida Court of Appeals held that oral license agreements involving
gambling equipment on gambling ocean vessels were subject to Florida’s state use
tax. Further, appellant was not entitled to have taxes involving his ocean vessels
prorated because appellant’s ocean vessels were not engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce.
The appellant owned several ocean vessels equipped with gambling
equipment. Companies would charter appellant’s vessels and take passengers on
cruises for the purpose of gambling. Gambling only took place when the vessels had
traveled outside of the three mile Florida state boundary limit. The companies
chartering these vessels entered into oral license agreements with Appellant for the
use of the gambling equipment.
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The court first considered whether the oral license agreements involving the
gambling equipment were subject to Florida’s state use tax. Florida Statute section
212.05 (1999) imposes a tax on sales, use, and other activities of Florida businesses.
Florida Statute section 212.02(20) (1999) defines “use” as “includ[ing] the exercise of
any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership thereof,
or interest therein . . . .” Appellant “exercise[d] his right or power over” his slot
machines in Florida when he entered into the oral license agreements; therefore, the
court concluded that the oral license agreements were subject to Florida’s use tax.
Second, the Court considered whether taxes resulting from Appellant’s
operation of his ocean vessels should be prorated pursuant to Florida Statute section
212.08 (1999). The statute provides a prorated tax rate to businesses engaged in
transporting people or property in interstate or foreign commerce. Following the
United State Supreme Court’s decision in Lords v. Steamship, 102 U.S. 541 (1880), the
Florida Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of the prorated tax rate was to
prevent companies, which engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, from being
over burdened by many sets of laws. Appellant conceded that his vessels never left
the United States. Following an analysis of Steamship, this Court found that though
appellant’s vessels left the state of Florida, the vessels never left the United States.
Appellant was not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and therefore,
appellant was not entitled to a prorated tax rate pursuant to Florida Statute section
212.08 (1999).
This decision clarifies an existing tax law so that it would apply to businesses
that fall in between those that conduct operations solely inside the state and those
that engage in interstate or foreign commerce. Not only did the Florida Court of
Appeals clarify the tax law as it applied to gambling ocean vessels, but through its
reasoning, it enables transactional attorneys to counsel their clients about whether a
particular business would be subject to certain taxes or entitled to certain exemptions
under these tax laws.
_____
Absent any significant differences, a state taxing scheme that burdens one
group more than another would be in violation of the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine. Kerr v. Killian, 65 P.3d 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
By Aaron B. Flinn
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that, when deciding if a state tax
procedure violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the court should
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focus on whether the imposition of a heavier tax burden on one group is justified by
and directly related to significant differences between the two groups. In doing so,
the court held that the Arizona statutes violated the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine.
Under 4 U.S.C. § 111, the United States consents to the taxation of its
employees by individual states, so long as the state taxing authority does not
discriminate against federal governmental employees based on their source of
compensation. Federal, state, and local employees are all required to make mandatory
contributions to their respective retirement plans; however, under 26 U.S.C. § 414(h),
Congress authorizes state and local employers to “pick up” these contributions. An
employer “picks up” contributions when the portion of an employee’s salary
designated for mandatory contributions is no longer considered compensation paid to
the employee, which excludes this amount from that employee’s federal gross income.
However, Congress elected not to “pick up” federal governmental employees
contributions, thereby forcing federal employees to include these contributions in their
federal gross income. Consequently, when a state uses an individual’s federal gross
income as the starting point for determining one’s state income tax, a federal
employee’s mandatory contribution is subject to taxation, while the corresponding
contribution of a state or local governmental employee whose employer “picks up”
this contribution is not.
A federal employee brought suit claiming that the Arizona taxing procedure
violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. Beginning in 1985, the Arizona
legislature decided to permit state and local governmental employers to “pick up” the
mandatory contributions of their employees. This subjected the mandatory
contributions of federal employees to taxation, while exempting the same
contributions of state and local governmental employees. In 1989, Kerr brought suit
claiming that Arizona statutory sections 43-1001(2) and 43-1022(2) violated the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. The court held that both statutes violated
the doctrine. (Kerr I; vacated on other grounds by Kerr II). The lower court held that
the Arizona law did not violate the doctrine since the statute did not discriminate
against the plaintiff “because of the source of [their] pay or compensation.” (emphasis
added). The issue for the Arizona Court of Appeals is whether or not Arizona’s taxing
scheme, via section 43-1001(2), violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine,
as codified at 4 U.S.C. § 111.
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The United States Supreme Court invalidated a similar Michigan tax scheme in
Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989). The Court stated that the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine is not violated so long as the inconsistent tax
treatment is directly related to, and justified by, “significant differences between the
two classes.” Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether the inconsistent treatment is
based on and justified by some significant differences between the two groups.
Holding that Arizona’s section 43-1001(2) did not violate the intergovernmental tax
immunity doctrine because it did not discriminate against Kerr based on his source of
pay, the appellate court in Kerr I erroneously focused on the literal language of 4 U.S.C.
§ 111, instead of following the holding in Davis. On reconsideration, however, the
appellate court realized its mistake and stated that, “[u]nder Davis and its progeny, the
only pertinent question is whether significant differences between [the] two classes
exist that are directly related to and justify this differential treatment.”
After examining the differences between the group of federal employees and
state and local employees, the court concluded that no such significant differences
existed since both are required to make mandatory contributions to their respective
retirement plans. Since there were no significant differences between the two groups
which could justify the differential treatment, the court concluded that Arizona’s
43-1001(2) violated the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.
Lawyers need to be aware that the proper inquiry, when deciding if a state’s
taxing procedure violates the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, should be
whether significant differences exist between the two groups of employees. These
significant differences must be directly related to and capable of justifying any unequal
tax burden. Absent any significant differences, a state taxing scheme that burdens one
group more than another would be in violation of the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine as codified in 4 U.S.C. § 111.
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